The EBRD is procuring a 12-week market study of Iraq's telecoms, digital infrastructure, and technology sectors. The study has two components, and they're sequential — the second builds on the first.
A diagnostic of Iraq's TMT sector across four dimensions: market dynamics & economics, competitive landscape & market structure, policy/regulation/institutional framework, and technology trends & innovation. This is structured research culminating in a comprehensive sector map.
Building on Component A, identify, profile, rank, and assess specific EBRD investment opportunities using their three-criteria framework: transition impact, policy engagement, and financial viability. This is the money section — it's why EBRD is paying for the study.
The timing is everything. EBRD became operational in Iraq in September 2025 — less than seven months ago. Their first investment was a $100M trade finance facility to the National Bank of Iraq. They're now building their TMT investment pipeline from scratch.
Simultaneously, EBRD just announced a conflict response plan aiming to deploy €5 billion across Middle Eastern economies — including Iraq — in 2026. And their new Strategic and Capital Framework (2026–2030) explicitly names Iraq expansion as a growth priority alongside sub-Saharan Africa.
This market study isn't academic. It's pipeline-building infrastructure — EBRD needs a bankable shortlist of TMT investments they can execute against. The team that wins this contract isn't just producing a report; they're shaping EBRD's first TMT investments in Iraq.
EBRD recently provided a €50M loan to Tunisie Telecom for 4G-to-5G network upgrade, fibre expansion connecting 200,000 households, and pioneering new cybersecurity standards. A €68M syndicated loan to Orange Egypt supported 5G rollout. These are the types of investments the Iraq study should surface. The winning proposal shows it understands this.
The proposal should name players, cite current dynamics, reference the March 2025 National Mobile Company decree, the Korek debt crisis, the 5G negotiations — not as padding, but to signal the team can hit the ground running in Week 1.
EBRD doesn't want a study that concludes "more research needed." They want a study that produces 5–8 profiled, ranked opportunities with financial product recommendations (equity, debt, guarantee, TC grant) attached to each.
Mirror EBRD's own language throughout: "inclusive, resilient, and green digital economies," "digital infrastructure and tech-enabled products and services as mutually reinforcing parts of an integrated digital landscape." They're scoring against their own framework.
Pragma's 40 years and Northeast Syria work are genuine assets. EBRD is new to Iraq and cautious — they need a team that understands operating where regulatory frameworks are contested and institutional capacity is thin.
Can you actually get meetings with CMC, the Ministry of Communications, Zain Iraq's leadership, Asiacell, Korek? The fieldwork period (Weeks 4–8) is short. Credible local networks matter enormously.
The Iraq mobile market is a three-operator oligopoly about to become four. Here's the current state:
| Operator | Market Share | Ownership | Key Developments |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zain Iraq | ~53% | Zain Group (Kuwait) | $1.1B revenue (2024), 11% YoY growth. Nokia microwave modernization (3,000 hops). Launched Oodi virtual 5G-ready MVNO (2021). |
| Asiacell | ~31% | Ooredoo (Qatar) | 8,201 LTE sites, best network quality (Opensignal). 5G NSA pilot in Erbil oil-service corridor. Multi-edge computing in Baghdad. |
| Korek Telecom | ~16% | Kurdish-owned | $1.3B outstanding government debt. CMC suspended internet services (Feb 2025). License expired/disputed. Parliamentary investigation. |
| National Mobile Co. | New entrant | State-owned (Iraq) | Established by March 2025 Cabinet decree. Sovereign-backed fourth operator. Terms and timeline unclear. |
Mobile penetration sits at 75–78%, below the regional average. Data and internet services captured 51.5% of market share in 2025. Average mobile download speed reached 36.4 Mbps (up 25% YoY). The regulatory environment is turbulent — the CMC operates independently of the Ministry of Communications, and jurisdictional tensions between the two are live and unresolved.
EBRD's key TMT counterpart is Antonia Maier, Regional Head of TMT, who appeared on a panel titled "Building Iraq's Digital Future" at Capacity Middle East 2026. Catarina Bjorlin Hansen is EBRD Head of Iraq.
Top Mountain owns the analytically demanding sections — the ones that demonstrate whether this team actually understands Iraq's TMT sector and has a credible methodology for diagnosing it. These sections are the difference between a boilerplate bid and a winning one.
| Section | Pages | Owner | What It Must Do |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Intro & Understanding | 1–2 | Top Mountain | Prove we know the landscape with specifics, not generics. Tie Iraq's opportunity to EBRD's strategic rationale. |
| 2. Vision & Approach | 1 | Top Mountain | Frame integrated diagnostic → investment pipeline approach. End with visual/infographic. |
| 3. Sector Assessment Methodology | 5–6 | Top Mountain | Four-dimension framework × four-step process. Anchor each dimension to specific Iraq dynamics, not generic language. |
| 3c. Policy/Regulation | 2–3 | Pragma / Kelly | Regulatory capacity assessment, licensing, spectrum, cybersecurity, data governance. We frame; Kelly fills. |
| 4. Investment Opportunities | 5–6 | Pragma | Opportunity identification, profiling, ranking, financial products. Our Section 3 work shapes this directly. |
Sections 1–3 represent roughly 7–9 pages of the most analytically demanding content. Section 4 is nominally Pragma's, but since it "builds directly on sectoral assessment findings," whoever commands Section 3 effectively shapes Section 4's framing too.
Run two parallel research streams that produce the raw material for all drafting:
A 3–5 page sourced briefing covering market structure, operator profiles, regulatory dynamics, infrastructure status, technology trends, and stakeholder map. Every claim sourced — no unsourced numbers.
A 2–3 page analysis of how EBRD evaluates and structures TMT investments. Maps precedent transactions (Tunisie Telecom, Orange Egypt, SSA TMT study) to a preliminary opportunity typology for Iraq.
Draft Sections 1, 2, and 3 using Phase 1 outputs. Produce near-final prose that Mike can review, adjust voice and tone, and approve for integration into the master proposal document.
Produce a populated work plan with real core activities replacing the "x" placeholders in TP.2.1(b) — even though this is Elifnaz's section, having a substantive draft helps the whole proposal cohere. Flag gaps in other sections. Produce a cross-check against likely EBRD scoring criteria.
These are the strategic threads that make this bid stand out. Each transforms a standard methodology section into something that shows genuine analytical command.
The March 2025 Cabinet decree creating a state-owned fourth MNO is the most significant structural change in Iraq's telecom market in a decade. Most proposals will treat it as background. We frame it as the central investment thesis: EBRD's mandate is transition impact through private-sector development, and a new state-owned operator presents both a risk (market distortion) and an opportunity (EBRD could structure entry around supporting competitive dynamics — e.g., regulatory TC for the new entrant's framework, or investment with governance conditions attached).
Korek's $1.3B debt, suspended internet services, and contested license create a live case study of Iraq's regulatory capacity. We position the Policy/Regulation dimension not as desk-research-about-laws but as an assessment of institutional capacity under stress — can CMC enforce, can disputes be resolved, is there legal certainty for investors? This is what EBRD needs before deploying capital.
Most bids will focus on domestic mobile and broadband. We identify Iraq's geographic position between the Gulf and Europe as a data centre and terrestrial cable corridor opportunity — exemplified by Zajil Telecom's ITPC partnership creating a GCC-to-Europe route through Iraq. This aligns with EBRD's infrastructure mandate and could attract GCC sovereign wealth co-investment.
| Item | Owner | Status | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key Expert 1–5 names and bios | Joe & Elifnaz | TBD — Critical | Cannot finalize methodology or team sections without named experts |
| Prior Assignments table (TP.1) | Joe, Elifnaz + Top Mountain | Overdue (Apr 10) | Proposal incomplete without real project entries |
| CVs (TP.3) | Jenny / Jennifer Lao | Overdue (Apr 12) | Proposal incomplete without expert credentials |
| Policy/Regulation sub-section (3c) | Pragma / Kelly | Due Apr 13 | Section 3 incomplete; we can frame, Kelly fills |
| Investment Opportunities section (4) | Pragma | Due Apr 13 | Our Section 3 shapes this; Pragma drafts |
| Work Plan (TP.2.1b) | Elifnaz | Due Apr 13 | We can provide a substantive draft to help |
| Work Schedule bar chart (TP.2.2) | Elifnaz | Due Apr 14 | Follows from work plan |
| Personnel-days grid (TP.2.3) | Elifnaz | Due Apr 14 | Requires Key Expert decisions |
| Vision infographic | Top Mountain (Mike) | Needed | Section 2 asks for "visual like we did before" |
| Top Mountain prior assignments | Mike | Needed | TP.1 table — comparable TMT / DFI work |
Once approved, we launch Streams P-1 and P-2 immediately and begin producing draftable content for Sections 1, 2, and 3. Turnaround: research streams today, draft sections today–tomorrow.